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This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tar-
iﬀ preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and
Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed by
Grossman and Helpman (1994) that is extended to explain the re-
lationship between foreign lobbying and tariﬀ preferences. Results
suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lob-
bying for tariﬀ preferences in the United States are around 50 per-
cent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated
weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government’s objective func-
tion when deciding whether or not to grant tariﬀ preferences to Latin
American and Caribbean exporters.
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This paper assesses the role played by foreign lobbying by Latin American
and Caribbean exporters in the United States in determining tariﬀ prefer-
ences granted by the United States government to Latin American countries
under diﬀerent preferential schemes (Andean Act, Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, GSP, Nafta, etc...). Not only the extent of tariﬀ preferences granted to
Latin America’s exporters is on paper quite signiﬁcant, but also more than
50 percent of Latin America’s exports to the United States enter under some
preferential scheme.
Empirical results suggest that lobbying expenditure in the United States
b yL a t i nA m e r i c a ne x p o r t e r sa r eas i g n i ﬁcant determinant of tariﬀpreferences
granted by the United States, even though most of the observed variation in
tariﬀ preferences is explained by other factors. Other country and product
characteristics seem to explain a much larger share of the variation in tariﬀ
preferences. However, it pays Latin American exporters to lobby for tariﬀ
preferences in the United States. Returns to lobbying are estimated to be
around 50 percent.“If the lobbyists had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent
them...”
Hermann Von Bertrab (1996)
Director of Mexico’s lobbying oﬃce in Washington, D.C. during Nafta nego-
tiations. (Translation by the authors.)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purpose of this paper is to assess the importance of lobbying by foreign
exporters in determining the extent of tariﬀ preferences granted by an im-
porting country. We focus on tariﬀ preferences granted by the United States
(US) to Latin American countries, for at least two reasons.1 First, the US
is the only country where foreign lobbying expenditures are publicly avail-
able. Second, the extent of tariﬀ preferences granted to Latin America by
the US is on paper quite important (Andean Act, CBI, CBTPA, GSP, Nafta,
Puerto Rico-CBI, and more recently Chile-United States). In practice, it also
accounts for a large share of Latin American exports to the United States:
around 50 percent.2
An important and growing empirical literature has been exploring the
importance of lobbying in determining trade policy in diﬀerent countries.
Most of the recent empirical and analytical literature is based on the work
1Throughout this paper, we abuse the deﬁnition of Latin America to include Caribbean
countries also; i.e., Latin America is deﬁned as the Western Hemisphere minus Canada
and the US.
2Around 82 percent of preferential exports entered under the NAFTA regime (Mexico
only) in the year 2000; CBTPA countries followed with 6 percent; GSP accounted for 4
percent; CBI for 3 percent and the Andean act regime for 2 percent of Latin America
preferential exports to the United States. Other special import regimes, such as the Civil
Aircraft, Pharmaceuticals and Dyes accounted for the rest of non-program-claimed imports
of the US from Latin America.
1of Grossman and Helpman (1994), which provided a ﬂexible framework to
analyze issues of lobbying and trade policy determination.3 So far most of the
literature has focused on the United States mainly due to data constraints
(see Gawande and Krishna, 2002).4. Empirical estimates suggests that there
is a non trivial role for domestic lobbying in the determination of the US
trade policy (see Gawande, 1997, Gawande and Bandhopadhyay, 2000 and
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999).
More recently, Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2002) focus on the role
of foreign lobbying in determining US Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariﬀs.5
They ﬁnd strong evidence that foreign lobbying tends to decrease MFN tariﬀs
in the US. In a related paper Jobst (2002) focuses on the impact that foreign
lobbying by Latin American countries had on their export growth to the
United States. He observes a strong positive correlation between foreign
lobbying and export growth. One channel through which this can be achieved
are tariﬀ preferences granted by the US to Latin American countries. In what
follows below we try to assess the role of foreign lobbying by Latin American
countries in explaining tariﬀ preferences granted by the US to these countries.
I n d e e d ,i nt h ec a s eo fs m a l lc o u n t r i e s ,s u c ha st h o s ei nL a t i nA m e r i c aw h i c h
represent individually less than 1 percent of world trade, lobbying would
3For a recent review of this literature see Grossman and Helpman (2001).
4Studies focused on developing countries include Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2003),
Cadot, Grether and Olarreaga (2003), Gawande, Sanguinetti and Bohara, (2003) and
Mitra, Thomakus and Ulubasoglu (2002).
5Most of the empirical literature in the US actually mainly explains non-tariﬀ barriers.
This is generally justiﬁed by the fact that tariﬀs are subject to multilateral tariﬀ negoti-
ations and therefore the political economy of trading partners would also determine their
level. Note that for any analysis after the Tokyo round this may also apply to non-tariﬀ
barriers depending on their nature.
2probably rather target preferential access rather than MFN tariﬀ reductions
which would beneﬁt all other exporting countries.
Although the empirical literature has found signiﬁcant support for the
idea that domestic and foreign lobbying are important determinants of trade
policy in the United States, it still faces an important puzzle: most estimates
of the weight granted to social welfare relative to lobbying contributions in
the US government’s objective function are extremely high: generally above
100. Such high values suggest that focusing on a non-political economy ob-
jective function for the United States could be a quite good approximation.
There are several reasons why estimates for the weight granted to social wel-
fare are so high (see Gawande and Krishna, 2002 for an exhaustive discussion
of these estimates). The one explored in this paper is that contribution func-
tions may not necessarily be continuous as generally assumed in the empirical
literature. Indeed, in the case of tariﬀ preferences granted by the US, contri-
bution functions are unlikely to be continuous as the US government either
grants full tariﬀ preference (zero tariﬀ) or no preferences at all under most
of its preferential schemes.6
This paper addresses two main questions: Can lobbying by Latin Amer-
ica’s exporters in the US explain the observed pattern of tariﬀ preferences?
And if yes, what is the return on $1 dollar of lobbying in the United States
by Latin American exporters?
Results suggests that lobbying by Latin American exporters to the US
government can indeed help explain the variation in tariﬀ preferences across
products and countries. Moreover, the returns to foreign lobbying seem to
6The exception being the phase-out periods of Nafta for example.
3be relatively high, around 50 percent. Finally, contrary to the empirical
literature for the United States described above we found very low values
for the estimates of the weight granted to social welfare in the government’s
objective function (around two times the weight granted to foreign lobbying
contributions), which underscores the importance of foreign (and domestic)
lobbying in determining US trade policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the pattern of
foreign contributions by Latin American producers in the United States,
as well as the structure of tariﬀ preferences granted by the United States.
Section 3 presents the analytical setup. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategy and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Foreign lobbying and tariﬀ preferences
This section discusses the data sources and variable construction and provides
a description of the pattern of Latin American lobbying and tariﬀ preferences
by country and sector.
2.1 Foreign Lobbying
The data set on foreign lobbying used in this paper was provided by the US
Department of Justice. Foreign lobbying activities have to be reported fol-
lowing the legislation known as the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA)
from 1938.7 The US Department of Justice organizes annually a report on
7Note that since 1995 foreign commercial lobbyists may actually also report under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act.
4foreign lobbying activities which is sent from the US Attorney General to
the US Congress. The FARA annual reports contain the name and address
of foreign agents, the name of the principals, the purpose of the agency and
the amount of money in return for the agent’s activities.8
First we separated the foreign lobbying expenditure data related to trade
on agricultural and industrial goods from those involving trade in services
and other types of foreign lobbying9. Then, each lobbying expenditure related
to trade on goods was mapped into 3-digit ISIC industries. This mapping
process was repeated for each entry found on the FARA report for 33 coun-
tries in Latin America. We used the FARA reports for 1997, 1998, 1999 and
2000. Finally, we calculated the average lobbying expenditure over this four
year period by 3-digit ISIC industry and by country. Trade related FARA
contributions by Latin American exporters reach 60 million dollars during
this period.
Some of the trade related contributions could not be mapped into partic-
ular sectors when they were undertaken by government agencies or private
chambers of commerce that encompass several industries. Most of the pa-
per excludes these contributions, except for the section on robustness tests,
where these contributions are included in the econometric analysis.
One characteristic of the foreign lobbying expenditure data is the high
concentration by sector and country. The ISIC 3-digit industries with the
largest expenditures are agriculture and livestock production (ISIC 111),
crude petroleum and natural gas production (ISIC 220) and manufacture
8For a detailed description of how foreign agents operate, see Jobst (2003).
9See the appendix for more information on foreign lobbying data.
5of transport equipment (ISIC 384) with, respectively, 62, 26 and 8 percent
of total expenditure. Thus, these three industries account for 96 percent of
total Latin America’s lobbying expenditure. Concentration is also very high
w h e no n el o o k st ot h es h a r eo fd i ﬀerent countries in some of these industries.
In agriculture and livestock production, Colombia accounted for 98 percent
of the total; in crude petroleum and natural gas production, Venezuela ac-
counted for 99 percent of the total, and, in the case of transport equipment,
Brazil was responsible for 98 percent of the total.
We can also split the countries in three groups according to geographic
localization. In this case each country can belong to South America or Caribe
and Central America or NAFTA (used for Mexico). South American coun-
tries are the largest lobbyists with 95 percent of total lobbying expenditures.
The sector with the largest expenditure in South America is agriculture and
livestock production (ISIC 111), which accounts for 64 percent of total South
American lobbying expenditures.
2.2 Tariﬀ Preferences
Tariﬀ preferences are deﬁned as the share of the Most-Favoured-Nation tar-
iﬀ that is waived to Latin American exporters under diﬀerent preferential
schemes. The data source is the excellent customs data set provided by the
United States International Trade Commission (USITC).10 It provides in-
f o r m a t i o no nt h ev a l u eo fi m p o r t sa n dd u t i e sp a i du n d e rd i ﬀerent import
regimes from each country at the tariﬀ line level (Harmonized System (HS)
8-digit). This allows us to calculate actual tariﬀ preferences (i.e., those ac-
10See dataweb.usitc.org.
6tually granted at customs and not ‘on paper’). The advantage is that actual
preferences capture the eﬀects of non-trade barriers (agriculture and textile &
clothing quotas, rules or origin, etc...) on the value of the preference granted
“on paper”.
To calculate the tariﬀ preferences at the 3-digit level of the ISIC classi-
ﬁcation we proceeded as follows. We obtained data on duties and import
values for each product exported by Latin American countries at the 8-digit
level of the HS classiﬁcation for the period 1997-2000. The average across
this four year period was calculated by country and by HS 8-digit line. For
the products exported by Latin American countries, we also collected data
on duties and import values from the world, but that entered the US under
the MFN regime. The actual tariﬀ collected on each of these 8-digit tariﬀ line
products was then calculated for US imports from Latin America, but also
from the world under the MFN regime by simply dividing duties collected
by the value of imports. This provided us with two tariﬀs: the (potentially)
preferential tariﬀ o ne a c hL a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r y ,d e n o t e dtF,a n dt h eM F N
tariﬀ, denoted t, at the 8-digit HS level.
Because the contribution data is only available at the 3-digit ISIC level, we
needed to ﬁlter our tariﬀ preferences from the 8-digit HS level to the 3-digit
ISIC level. The tariﬀ data was aggregated to the 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation
using the HS 8-digit exports of each Latin American country to the US within
a 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation as weights (both for the Latin American tariﬀ
and for the MFN tariﬀs).11 Then, we deﬁne the US tariﬀ preferences to Latin
11We used the same weights in order to avoid aggregation bias when moving from the







t if tF 9 t,
0 otherwise
where it is clear that θ is censored between 0 and 1. W en o t i c et h a tt h e
closer θ is to 1 the larger is the tariﬀ preference that exporters from a Latin
American country in a respective 3-digit ISIC receive from the United States.
The total number of US tariﬀ preferences across countries and products used
in this work is 1,087. About 22 and 14 percent of the US trade preferences
calculated are equal to 0 and 1, respectively.12
The 3-digit ISIC Latin American industries that received the highest US
trade preferences from 1997 to 2000 are agriculture services (ISIC 112), metal
ore mining (ISIC 230), manufacture of paper and paper products (ISIC 341)
and tobacco manufactures (ISIC 314); all with a preference ratio (θ)a b o v e9 5
percent. At the bottom of the product list in terms of preferences granted by
the US to Latin American exporters, there is ﬁshing (ISIC 130), agriculture
and livestock production (ISIC 111) and footwear (ISIC 324); all these sectors
faced a preference ratio below 20 percent.
The countries that received the largest US trade preferences from 1997 to
2000 were Suriname, Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Guyana
and Paraguay with an average preferential ratio of 85 percent; i.e., on average
12Around 61 percent of the values of θ which are zero are negative and were censored.
One reason for the existence of negative preferences in our data is the use of anti-dumping
duties by the United States. In the case of agricultural products, the presence of in-
and out-of-quota tariﬀ rates is also a reason for negative preferences. Note that the only
negative preferences are observed in the case of agriculture and livestock production.
8exporters from these countries paid only 15 percent of the MFN tariﬀ on
their exports. Although Mexico belongs to the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA), seven Latin American countries received higher preferences
than Mexico. One reason for the unexpected lower US trade preference to
Mexico vis-a-vis other countries not members of NAFTA is that rules of
origin in that trade bloc are very stiﬀ, obligating many Mexican exports
within NAFTA to use the US’s MFN regime as shown by Estevadeordal et
al. (2002). At the bottom of the country list, there is Guatemala, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Honduras, Bermudas, Saint Lucia and Dominican Republic; all
these countries enjoyed almost zero preferences on their exports to the United
States.
Note that tariﬀ preferences granted by the United States at the tariﬀ line
level are usually full preferences, i.e., θ =1 .I no u rd a t as e tθ is a continuous
variable for several reasons. First, the data is aggregated at the 3-digit ISIC
level. Second, some of the preferential agreements have phase-out periods for
preferential tariﬀ elimination. Finally, even if full preferences are granted on
paper, some exports may still enter under the MFN regime, because they do
not satisfy rules of origin.
3A n a l y t i c a l s e t u p
Consider an economy in which consumers maximize a quasi-linear utility
function




9Good zero is the numeraire. Given this functional form, there is no income
or substitution eﬀect on demand. The supply side is a speciﬁc-factor model
where primary inputs into production are sector-speciﬁc capital and mobile
labor. Production of good zero uses labor only under CRS, which ﬁxes the
wage rate. Thus, there is no general-equilibrium eﬀect on the supply side
either. Owners of sector-speciﬁc capital have an incentive to get politically
organized and lobby for trade policies so as to raise capital’s return. Resident
owners of speciﬁc capital have mass zero in the population and consequently
do not consider their consumption bundle or share of tariﬀ revenue when
lobbying the home government.
The political game is as follows. Politically organized owners of speciﬁc
capital, whether nationals or foreigners, lobby the domestic government for
trade policies that are advantageous to them. For domestic import-competing
producers, this means asking for tariﬀs on imports, whereas for foreign pro-
ducers exporting into the domestic market, it means asking for tariﬀ pref-
erences. In order to simplify the setup, we will assume that ROW imports
(imports from non-preferred countries) are suﬃciently large to absorb the
increase in preferential imports that would result from full preferences. This
“large market” assumption ensures that there is no political rivalry between
domestic and preferential-partner lobbies who in eﬀect try to inﬂuence two
distinct and independent policy instruments (the MFN tariﬀ and the rate of
preference respectively).
Lobbies move ﬁrst, domestic ones by oﬀering contributions conditioned
on the MFN tariﬀ in their sector of activity, and foreign ones by simultane-
ously oﬀering contributions conditioned on the rate of tariﬀ preference. Let
10the number of trade partners be denoted by n. Then the government picks
an m×(n +1 )matrix of MFN tariﬀs and preference rates. Given the absence
of general-equilibrium eﬀects and the “large market” assumption, the game
is a collection of independent principal-agent problems. The form of these
principal-agent relationships diﬀers, however, because the government’s ac-
tion is a continuous variable in the case of MFN tariﬀs and a binary one in
t h ec a s eo fp r e f e r e n c e s .
In the logic of common-agency models a la Bernheim-Whinston (1986b),
domestic lobbies face the government with truthful contribution schedules,
i.e. functions of the MFN tariﬀ whose derivative is equal to the derivative
of their own proﬁt function. Foreign lobbies, by contrast, face the govern-
ment with pairs of transfers corresponding to the two possible values of the
preference rate (zero and full). Alternatively, one may think of the game
between the government and foreign lobbies as a standard auction in which
the latter buy indivisible preferences. This game is considerably simpler than
a menu auction a la Bernheim-Whinston (1986a). Sticking to the principal-
agent interpretation, each foreign lobby oﬀers the smallest transfer inducing
the government to grant preferences, which means, in the absence of hidden
action, that the lobby keeps the entire protection rent.
The government ignores the simultaneous game between other (foreign
and domestic) lobbies by virtue of the model’s independence properties. Let
i =1 ,...,n denote trading partners (i.e. countries) and let k =1 ,...,m denote
tariﬀ lines (i.e., products). Let tk be the home country’s MFN tariﬀ on good
k and ti
k ∈ {0,t k} be the preferential tariﬀ a p p l i e do ng o o dk originating from
preferential partner i. As indicated by the notation, preferences are either
11full (ti
k =0 )o rn i l( ti














k) be the contribution schedule oﬀered by foreign lobby k from coun-
try i to the home government, and Ck(tk) that oﬀered by domestic import-





















m) is the vector of tariﬀ preferences granted to partner
i, t =( t1,...,tm) is the vector of MFN tariﬀsa n dW(·) is the aggregate









Let V (0) be the value of the government’s objective function when θ
i
k =0
and V0 its value when lobby (i,k) does not contribute, i.e., when Ci
k =0 .
The latter is the government’s reservation value. In equilibrium, the two will
necessarily be equal, but this equality is a property of the equilibrium, not
a part of the game’s deﬁnition. Finally, let v0 be the value of the foreign
lobbies objective function, when they do not contribute, i.e., when Ci
k =0 .











k) ≥ V (0), (3)
V (θ
i
k) ≥ V0, (4)
v
i
k ≥ v0. (5)
Expression (2) ensures that the deal is jointly optimal for both parties, a
standard requirement of incentive contracts. Inequality (3) is an incentive
constraint whereby the government ﬁnds it proﬁtable to choose the lobby’s
preferred action (grant positive preference). Inequality (4) is the government
participation constraint whereby accepting the deal is at least as good as
leaving it. Inequality (5) captures lobbies’ participation constraint.
Transfers from lobby to government being costly, the ﬁrst two inequalities
are binding in equilibrium. Using (1), (3) and (4), one has Ci


























k is the change in social welfare due to preferences granted to
lobby (i,k).
Because foreign exporters are suﬃciently small, their entire export sup-
ply at existing home prices cannot be larger than the home country import
13demand.13 This ensures that home prices remain unchanged after granting
tariﬀ preferences to foreign exporters. This implies that in the importing
country there are no changes in consumer surplus or domestic producer sur-
plus associated with the tariﬀ preferences.14 Thus, the change in welfare is
simply driven by the change in tariﬀ revenue and the foreign lobbying con-
tribution of exporters of good k in country i. Thus, equation (6) implicitly











k denotes the tariﬀ revenue change due to preferences granted to
exporters of good k from country i.N o t et h a tCi
k enters the home country
welfare function, as these contributions represent additional income to the
home country. Tariﬀ revenue is deﬁned as:
TR
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where mk are total home imports of good k, xi
k are exports of good k by











13This assumption was checked in the application to Latin American preferences in the
US market. Indeed, in the year 2000, in none of the 38 3-digit ISIC sectors, exports to the
world of any single Latin American country were larger than imports of the United States
from the world.
14And as suggested above no incentives for domestic producers to counter-lobby the tariﬀ
preference. Note that this also assumes that the whole rent from the tariﬀ preferences is
captured by the exporters and not the importers.
14This contribution level is feasible for the foreign ﬁrm if inequality (5) is
satisﬁe d .I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti ti sa l w a y st h ec a s ei fa>0.













Interior values for θ
i
k will be obtained by aggregation in the empirical part, or
simply because rules of origin only allow certain exporters from a particular
country to beneﬁt from the preferences on paper.15 A stochastic version
of (10) will allow us to estimate the parameter a in the US government’s
objective function. A discussion of the empirical methodology can be found
in the next section.
The return to foreign lobbying by exporters from country i for tariﬀ pref-
erences in good k is then given by the ratio of the increase in proﬁts associated

















Thus, the inverse of the weight given to social welfare in the home country
government’s objective function yields the return to foreign lobbying for tariﬀ
preferences. The higher is the weight granted to social welfare in the govern-
ment’s objective function, the lower are the returns to foreign lobbying.
Recent estimates of a for the United States (Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay, 2000 and Goldberg and Maggi, 1999) suggest ﬁgures above 100. This
15See discussion in Section 2.2.
16Note that this is an over-estimate if the elasticity of export supply is positive.
15would imply that the return to foreign lobbying is very small: below 1 per-
cent. But this seems at odds with the ﬁgures discussed in the previous
sections. On average for the period 1997-2000, Latin American trade related
contributions under FARA amounted to US$ 15 million, whereas the value
of preferences, calculated as θtxf, was around US$ 4 billion. This suggests a
much higher return (around 26,000 percent) and a value for a close to zero.
One may ask why not stop here if the objective is to obtain the return
to foreign lobbying in Latin America. What’s wrong with the 26,000 per-
cent number calculation?17 There are several problems with this type of
calculation. First lobbying expenditure reported under FARA may seriously
under-estimate total lobbying expenditure.18 If this was the case, returns to
foreign lobbying can actually be much smaller than the ﬁgure provided above.
On the other hand the lobbying expenditure reported under FARA may not
necessarily reﬂect tariﬀ preferences, but other trade-related issues (regulatory
trade issues for example). Perhaps, more importantly, tariﬀ preferences are
not exclusively due to foreign lobbying. Other political and economic factors
enter also into consideration. In order to check whether the tariﬀ preferences
reﬂect foreign lobbying, as suggested above, we will estimate equation (10).
In our econometric approach, measurement error in lobbying expenditures
(such as under-reporting) will be corrected by the use of instrumental vari-
ables (see next section). The fact that tariﬀ preferences may be granted
17This question was actually raised in several of our informal interviews with foreign
agents registered under FARA.
18Some of the lobbying expenditure may be reported under the Lobbying Disclosure Act;
some may be under the de minimis level necessary for reporting and some may simply
escape through legislation loopholes as for example the political contributions granted by
the law ﬁrms in which foreign agents work and which may help them later to obtain access
to policy-makers.
16to speciﬁc countries for political reasons, and/or that certain products are
more likely to beneﬁtf r o mt a r i ﬀ preferences, due for example to US domestic
lobbying, will be controlled by country and industry dummies.
4E m p i r i c a l s t r a t e g y
Our empirical strategy consists of estimating a stochastic version of equation
(10). Because the endogenous variable, θ, is bound at 0 (no preference) and
1 (full preference) a Tobit estimator is necessary.
When aggregating tariﬀ and trade data from the 8-digit HS level to the
3-digit ISIC level one may introduce some heteroskedasticity due to group
aggregation if one believes that the equation to be estimated is determined
at the 8-digit HS level and if the number of 8-digit HS tariﬀ lines in each
3-digit ISIC industry is not the same. In order to correct for this potential
heteroskedasticity problem, we follow a parametric correction suggested by
Dickens (1990). It consists in estimating (10) and then running the error
term against the inverse of the number of 8-digit HS tariﬀ lines in each 3-
digit ISIC industry. The constant of such a regression provides an estimate
of the variance of the industry level component of the error term, whereas
the coeﬃcient in front of the inverse of the number of lines provides an
estimate of the variance of the tariﬀ line level component of the error term.
To obtain asymptotically eﬃcient estimates, one re-weighs each observation
at the industry level using these variance estimates.19
An important problem with the estimation of equation (10) is that the
19We alternatively provide estimates with no heteroskedasticity correction.
17right-hand side is endogenous. Indeed, the ratio of contributions to Latin
American exports is obviously endogenous to the preference margin. Previ-
ous empirical studies of the political economy of tariﬀs in the US, such as
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), use
factor shares and traditional exogenous political economy variables to control
for endogeneity problems in a protection equation similar to the one shown in
(10). We follow a similar approach using factor shares and their products to
control for endogeneity problems in the estimation of (10).20 However, other
political economy variables used in the mentioned studies like concentration
ratios and unionization indexes are not available for most Latin American
economies and their estimation are beyond the scope of this work.
We therefore proceeded using a two-stage Tobit. In the ﬁrst stage we
run the ratio of contributions to Latin American exports (Ci
k/[tkxi
k])o nt h e
instruments described above. In the second stage, we use the ﬁtted value of
the above regression instead of the ratio itself as an explanatory variable.
5R e s u l t s
Table 1 provides results for the estimation of a stochastic version of (10) for
our sample of Latin American countries. The ﬁrst column provides a simple
estimation of (10) without constant, country or product dummies and with-
out any correction for endogeneity or heteroskedasticity. The second column
provides estimates with the endogeneity correction and the third column
adds a constant to the endogeneity correction. The fourth column further
20See the appendix for a description of the instruments used.
18corrects for the potential heteroskedasticity introduced by aggregating the
data at the industry level when preferences are determined at the tariﬀ line
level. The parametric correction we introduced follows Dickens (1990). The
ﬁfth column adds country and industry dummies, but does not correct for
heteroskedasticity. Finally, the sixth column provides our preferred estimate
of a and corrects for both for heteroskedasticity and endogeneity of our right-
hand-side variable, as well as controlling for any industry or country speciﬁc
eﬀect.
Estimates of (1 + a)/a oscillate between 0.6 and 4.8. But these two
extremes are obtained before a constant is introduced into the regression.
Once the constant is introduced estimates of (1 + a)/a are relatively robust.
They oscillate between 1.18 and 1.52. This in turn implies that estimates of
a oscillate between 2 and 6; and that returns to foreign lobbying by Latin
American exporters in the US provides returns of 18 to 52 percent.21
Our preferred estimates are those in the last column, where we control
for any systematic country or product variation in preference (as well as for
endogeneity and heteroskedasticity). The point estimate for a is around 2.08
and therefore r =4 8percent.
Table 2 provides the same estimates as in Table 1 but the sample excludes
Mexico. The reason is that Mexico is a member of Nafta and may therefore
be subject to a very diﬀerent regime than the other Latin American countries
that our country and product dummies may not capture. Moreover, Mex-
ico accounts for more than 50 percent of total preferential exports of Latin
21Note that using the estimated standard errors for a and r non-linearly, we can reject
the hypothesis that a>14 (and therefore r<8 percent) in all regressions with 95 percent
conﬁdence.
19America to the US.22 Results are very similar to the ones reported in Table
1. If we go by our preferred estimates in the last two columns of Table 1,
it seems that returns of foreign lobbying are lower for the non-Mexico Latin
American countries. Indeed, returns to foreign lobbying contributions are es-
timated around 32 percent instead of 48 percent when we include Mexico.23
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the foreign lobbying process
has a learning component. Foreign lobbying becomes more eﬀective as they
acquire more experience and get accustomed to the ways of doing business
in the US political arena (see for example von Bertrab, 1996).
As a robustness check we provide results including government agencies
lobbying expenditures and other business associations that we could not al-
locate to any speciﬁc industry with the data provided by the DOJ. Because
half of the lobbying expenditures we identiﬁed as being trade-related were
undertaken by government agencies or other generic business associations, it
seems important to check the results when these are included.24 The prob-
lem is how to distribute these lobbying expenditures across sectors in the
exporting country. Two methods were followed. First, we used the lobbying
country exports to the world as weights to distribute across sectors. As an
alternative and to avoid any simultaneity issue we use exports to the rest of
the world (i.e., excluding the United States). In order to avoid introducing
too much “artiﬁcial” variation across sectors, we reduce the industry disag-
22Almost all enters under Nafta.
23The estimate for a is around 3.1. Note that taken literally this suggests that monetary
contributions from diﬀerent countries are valued diﬀerently by the US government.
24Note that lobbying expenditures by foreign industries can sometimes be undertaken
through government agencies, or at least in collaboration with government agencies as the
Mexican experience in Nafta suggests; see von Bertrab (1996).
20gregation to the 2-digit level of the ISIC (potentially 16 exporting sectors per
country). Finally to avoid attributing lobbying expenditure by government
agencies and generic business associations that were undertaken for other
reasons than tariﬀ preferences to any of the sectors, we arbitrarily decide
that if the ﬁnal lobbying expenditure of any particular sector was more than
2t i m e st h et a r i ﬀ revenue collected on those exports, then the observation
was dropped.25
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 3 provide results at the 2-digit level of the
ISIC, but without including government agencies lobbying expenditures. The
ﬁrst column does not correct for heteroskedasticity whereas the second col-
umn undertakes the correction mentioned above. Thus, results correspond
to the ones reported in the ﬁfth and sixth columns of Table 1, but at a
higher level of industry aggregation. The third and fourth columns include
Latin America’s government agencies lobbying expenditures in the US dis-
aggregated across industries using exports to the world. The ﬁfth and sixth
columns report results using exports to the rest-of-the-world (i.e., excluding
the US) as weights. Again results reported in Table 3 are consistent with
the ones reported so far. The estimates of a that use government agencies
lobbying expenditures are smaller than those reported in Table 1 and the
returns to foreign lobbying are somehow higher: between 62 and 97 percent
depending on the method used to distribute government agencies lobbying
expenditures across 2-digit ISIC sectors. Note that one may have a preference
for the results reported in columns (5) and (6), which use Latin American
25This eliminated around 15 percent of the total sample before implementing this rule.
Note that without this cleaning of the data the ratio of lobbying expenditure to potential
tariﬀ revenue foregone could be as high as 30,000, which is clearly misleading.
21exports to the rest of the world, which are likely to be less endogenous than
exports to the world (which includes exports to the US). In such a case the
returns to foreign lobbying are higher (although not statistically so) than
those reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1, suggesting that coopera-
tion between government agencies and private sector lobbying could generate
important returns.26 Note that similar results were obtained when excluding
Mexico from the sample. The returns to lobbying are higher (although not
statistically so) when including lobbying expenditure by governments and
chambers of commerce.27
Finally, note that lobbying only explains a very small part of the tariﬀ
preference variation. Without the inclusion of country and product dummies,
the pseudo-R2 are well below 1 percent. Many other determinants of tariﬀ
preferences are captured by the product and country dummies, as well as the
error term. Nevertheless, the returns to foreign lobbying seem to be relatively
high.
26Note that this collaboration between the private sector and the foreign government
when lobbying in the US was recognized as being crucial during Nafta negotiations. Mayer
(1998) indicates that the Mexican business sector was always very close to Mexican gov-
ernment oﬃcials during Nafta negotiations: “They used to call them: ‘el cuarto de al lado’
” (i.e., the room next door).
27When Mexico is not in the sample the returns to lobbying are around 45 percent when
lobbying expenditures by government agencies and regional chambers of commerces are
included. This is higher (although not statisically so) than the 32 percent return obtained
in the results provided in Table 2, when lobbying expenditures by government agencies
and regional chambers of commerce are not included.
226C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Almost 50 percent of US imports from Latin America enter under a prefer-
ential tariﬀ regime. This paper explores the importance of lobbying in the
US by Latin American exporters in explaining the extent of tariﬀ preferences
granted by country and product.
Empirical results suggest that lobbying by Latin American exporters is
indeed a signiﬁcant determinant of tariﬀ preferences, although not a very
important one. Other country and product characteristics seem to explain
a much larger share of the variation in tariﬀ preferences granted by the US
government to Latin American exporters. However, it pays Latin American
exporters to lobby for tariﬀ preferences in the US. Returns to foreign lobbying
are estimated to be around 50 percent.
Last, but not least, we provide a methodology to estimate the weight given
to social welfare in the US government objective function (relative to lobby-
ing contributions) in the case of a non-diﬀerentiable contribution function.
Indeed, in the case of tariﬀ preferences in the US, the foreign contribution
function is likely to be non-continuous as preferences are generally either fully
granted or not granted at all in the United States. Relaxing the continuous
contribution function assumption provided us with an estimate of the weight
granted to social welfare (a) around 2, partly solving the empirical puzzle of
the empirical literature, where estimates for the US are above 100.
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26Table 1: Estimating returns to LAC lobbyinga
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1 + a)/a 0.59 4.76 1.22 1.18 1.52 1.48
(.36) (1.02) (.60) (.62) (.56) (.52)
Constant 0.57 0.55 0.14 0.21
(.20) (.20) (.14) (.14 )
Hetero. corr. No No No Yesb No Yesb
Country dum. No No No No Yes Yes
Industry dum. No No No No Yes Yes
# obs. 1062 1062 1055 1055 1055 1055
Pseudo R2 NA NA .002 .001 .21 0.25
ˆ a -2.43 0.27 4.55 5.55 2.38 2.08
ˆ r ∞ 3.76 .22 .18 .52 .48
aFigures in parenthesis are standard errors. The estimation technique is a two-stage
tobit to control for the endogeneity of our right-hand-side variable, except for the ﬁrst
column where a simple tobit is used to estimate the parameter (1+ a)/a.
bThe heteroskedasticity correction follows Dickens (1990).
27Table 2: Excluding Mexico (Nafta preferences)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1 + a)/a 0.59 4.10 1.22 1.18 1.35 1.32
(.36) (0.91) (.57) (.57) (.49) (.46)
Constant 0.57 0.59 0.17 0.23
(.20) (.21) (.14) (.14)
Hetero. corr. No No No Yesb No Yesb
Country dum. No No No No Yes Yes
Industry dum. No No No No Yes Yes
# obs. 1025 1025 1025 1018 1018 1018
Pseudo R2 NA NA .003 .003 .26 0.28
ˆ a -2.43 0.32 4.55 5.55 3.33 3.13
ˆ r ∞ 3.10 .22 .18 .35 .32
aFigures in parenthesis are standard errors. The estimation technique is a two-stage
tobit to control for the endogeneity of our right-hand-side variable, except for the ﬁrst
column where a simple tobit is used to estimate the parameter (1+ a)/a.
bThe heteroskedasticity correction follows Dickens (1990).
28Table 3: Including Government Agencies contributions — 2 digit ISIC a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1 + a)/a 1.35 1.36 1.62 1.62 1.97 1.97
(.39) (.39) (.39) (.39) (.41) (.42)
Constant 0.57 0.57 0.35 0.35 0.06 0.06
(.18) (.18) (.20) (.20) (.23) (.23)
Hetero. corr. No Yesb No Yesb No Yesb
Country dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs. 304 304 304 304 304 304
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.33 .44 .44 .46 0.28
ˆ a 2.85 2.77 1.61 1.61 1.03 1.03
ˆ r .35 .36 .62 .62 .97 .97
aFigures in parenthesis are standard errors. The estimation technique is a two-stage
tobit to control for the endogeneity of our right-hand-side variable.
bThe heteroskedasticity correction follows Dickens (1990).
29Data Appendix
Foreign Contribution Data
The US department of Justice provides data on foreign lobbying through the
Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) annual reports. The FARA annual
reports contain the name and address of foreign agents, the name of the
principals, the purpose of the agency and the amount of money in return
for the agent’s activities. Following the information contained on the FARA
website28, an agent of a foreign principal is any individual or organization
whose activities are directed by a foreign principal ﬁlling one of the criteria
below29:
- Engages in political activities;
- Acts in a public relations capacity for a foreign principal;
- Solicits or dispenses anything of value within the United States for a
foreign principal;
- Represents the interests of a foreign principal before any agency or
oﬃcial of the U.S. government.
Since this paper studies the role of Latin American contributions on trade
preferences granted by the US, we need to eliminate from the original data
those contributions not related to trade. To make the process easier we follow
Krishna et al. (2001) and organize the original FARA contribution data for
the years of 1997 through 2000 in six categories as follows:
(1) Tourist boards or private and/or government chambers of commerce
that encourage general business contacts;
(2) Government to government contacts;
(3) Service industries;
28The FARA, its annual reports and additional legislation on foreign lobbying can be
found on the electronic address www.usdoj.gov/criminal/FARA.
29See also the helpfull "Q&A" document at http://www.usdoj.gov./criminal/fara/q_A.htm.
30(4) Agriculture or raw material industries;
(5) Foreign political parties that were campaigning among ethnic dias-
pores or seeking U.S. government recognition for their cause;
(6) Manufacturing industries.
The FARA annual reports for 1997-2000 totalized 619 entries for the 33
countries of Latin America. The average per year of all the entries reached
102 million dollars. From the six categories identiﬁed above only the ones
with numbers (4) and (6) are clearly related to trade on goods. Then, we
decided to eliminate contributions from categories (1), (2), (3) and also those
purely from political purposes located in category (5).
Contributions from categories (4) and (6) were mapped into 3-digit ISIC
codes using the name of the contribution’s principal and the purpose of the
agency. The table below gives some interesting features about the compo-
sition of the data set. It is interesting to note that from 619 entries in the
FARA reports only 109 were related to lobbying from speciﬁc industries in
the manufacturing or agriculture sectors. Besides, only 15 percent of total
contributions from Latin American countries were done directly by private
agents like those contained in categories (4) and (6). Category (4) accounted
for 25 percent of the entries and categories (6) for the remaining 75 percent.
Tariﬀ Preferences and Trade Data
Data on US duties and import values from the world and for each Latin
American country from 1997 to 2000 were obtained from the USITC web
site (dataweb.usitic.gov). To convert the data from the 8-digit level of the
harmonized system to the ISIC 4-digit classiﬁcation, we used the ﬁlter built
by Jerzy Rozanski from the World Bank
31Instruments
The GTAP database for the year of 1995 provides data on sector factor ex-
penditure and output values for many countries in Latin America. When
data is not available for a particular country, the GTAP database provides
ﬁgures for the a group of countries (including the missing one). Factor ex-
penditure in any sector for each Latin American country is divided in capital,
skilled labor, unskilled labor, natural resources and land expenditures. In-
formation contained in the GTAP manual was used to ﬁlter the data from
the GTAP classiﬁcation to the 3-digit ISIC level. When the data on factor
expenditures and value of output was ﬁltered to the 3-digit level of the ISIC
classiﬁcation, factor shares were calculated dividing each factor expenditure
by the value of output. For those countries where particular information
was not available the factor shares of the regions they belonged to were used
instead.
List of Latin American Countries
Antigua, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda Bolivia,
Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherland Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Santa Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
6.1 ISIC 3-digit sectors
ISIC Description
111 Agriculture and livestock production
112 Agriculture Services





32220 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Production





321 Manufacture of Textiles
322 Manufacture of Wearing Apparel, except footwear
323 Manufacture of Leather and products of Leather, and substitutes
324 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber
331 Manufacture of wood and wood products, including furniture
332 Manufacture of furniture and ﬁxtures, except primarily of metal
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products
342 Printing, publishing and allied products
351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals
352 Manufacture of other chemical products
353 Petroleum Reﬁneries
354 Manufacture of Miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
355 Manufacture of Rubber Products
356 Manufacture of Plastic Products not elsewhere classiﬁed
361 Manufacture of pottery, China and Earthenware
362 Manufacture of Glass and Glass products
369 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
371 Iron and Steel basic industries
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery
382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery apparatus
384 Manufacture of transport equipment
385 Manufacture of professional and scientiﬁc,
390 Other manufacturing industries
33